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Categories of Corporate Complicity in
Human Rights Abuses*
BY ANDREW CLAPHAM** AND SCOTr JERBI***

Introduction
The movement towards greater corporate social responsibility is
now entering a phase where the parameters of this responsibility are
being defined. In the field of human rights, there are growing
expectations that corporations should do everything in their power to
promote universal human rights standards, even in conflict situations
where governance structures have broken down. At the same time,
corporations may fear that they are being asked to take on
responsibilities of the state. This is coupled with concerns, including
by some human rights advocates, that by stressing the corporate role,
government responsibilities for protecting human rights could
inadvertently be downgraded.
The boundaries of what is expected from business, and what a
state is obliged to do under international law, cannot be neatly drawn.
It must be stressed, however, that governments do still possess wide
powers over-and primary responsibility for-the well being of their
citizens and for the protection of human rights. Corporations, even as
they agree to take on greater responsibility in the human rights field,
do not have the same legal duties as states under international law
and cannot be expected to substitute for the role of governments.
What is the responsibility of a business with operations in a
country where human rights violations are widespread or where
* This paper is based on a background paper for the Global Compact dialogue
on the role of the private sector in zones of conflict, New York, March 21-22, 2001.
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company revenues help support an oppressive regime? Should a
corporation be expected to influence government policies concerning
human rights and the rule of law? What role should business play in
conflict prevention and resolution or in development efforts? It is
against this background that the notion of corporate complicity in
human rights violations has emerged.
In broad terms, the suggestion of complicity often implies that
corporations may aid and abet serious violations of international law
by the State. Advocates of greater corporate accountability for
human rights violations argue that companies do sometimes
significantly contribute to the ability of a government to carry out
systematic abuses of human rights. At the same time, business
leaders have raised concerns about the lack of clarity in the definition
of corporate complicity and the possible damage that such
accusations can cause to business reputations.
I. Putting Complicity in Context
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is one of the
foundations of international human rights law. It is accepted as a
statement of universal human rights, i.e., the rights it proclaims are to
be respected in every country or culture. The Declaration also serves
as a point of reference for good practice and benchmarks, including
for business. The preamble of the Universal Declaration states that
"every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures,
national and international, to secure their universal and effective
recognition and observance .... "
As a major guide and compilation of corporate practice in the
field of human rights points out:
While companies may not be in the habit of referring to themselves
as 'organs of society,' they are a fundamental part of society. As
such, they have a moral and social obligation to respect the
universal rights enshrined in the Declaration. While a company is
not legally obliged under international law to comply with these
standards, those companies who have violated them have found, to
their cost, that society at large will condemn them. A growing
nucleus of transnational companies has incorporated an explicit
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, preamble (1948).
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commitment in their business principles and
codes of conduct to
2
uphold the rights enshrined in the UDHR.
When U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan first proposed the
Global Compact in January 1999, he asked world business to
"support and respect the protection of international human rights
within their spheres of influence" and "to make sure
3 their own
corporations were not complicit in human rights abuses.,
We could describe these first two of the Global Compact's nine
principles as containing two basic rules. First, a responsibility to
promote human rights and a duty to avoid commission of abuses, and,
second, a prohibition on complicity in others' human rights
violations.4
The spectrum of activities that have been linked to the notion of
corporate complicity in human rights abuses is well described in the
beginning of Margaret Jungk's PracticalGuide to Addressing Human
Rights Concerns for Companies OperatingAbroad:
Regrettably, multinationals are sometimes guilty of complicity in
human rights violations perpetrated by governments. There are
many cases where businesses have, for example, promoted the
forcible transfer of populations from land which they required for
business operations. At other times, by simply "doing business"
with the national government, companies have unintentionally
aggravated human rights disputes, for example, in cases where
minority groups have claimed autonomy over an area. Even where
a company's operations do not directly impact upon human rights
issues, the company may nonetheless be called upon to speak out or
act when an oppressive government violates its citizens' rights."
This range of expectations represents the contemporary meaning
given to the complicity concept in the literature on business and
human rights. One could ask whether this list is complete and
whether there are different degrees or types of complicity. To begin
to address these issues, it is suggested that the concept of complicity
2. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

&

THE PRINCE OF WALES BUSINESS LEADERS

FORUM, HUMAN RIGHTS: Is IT ANY OF YOUR BUSINESS? 23 (2000) [hereinafter Al &

PWBF].
3. Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, Address to World Economic Forum
(Jan. 31,1999), in U.N. Doc. No. SG/SM/6881/Rev.1 (1999).
4. Global
Compact,
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.orglun/gc/unweb.nsf/content/thenine.htm (last visited
Aug. 31,2001).
5. MARGARET JUNGK, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ADDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS
CONCERNS FOR COMPANIES OPERATING ABROAD 171 (1999).
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should be divided into three categories: direct, indirect and silent
complicity.
II. Direct Corporate Complicity
Much of the business and human rights literature avoids drawing
up clear boundaries for the categories of corporate complicity in
human rights abuses. A review of international criminal law suggests
that direct complicity requires intentional participation, but not
necessarily any intention to do harm, only knowledge of foreseeable
harmful effects. A corporation that knowingly assists a state in
violating the customary international law principles contained in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights could be viewed as directly
complicit in such a violation. For example, a company that promoted,
or assisted with, the forced relocation of people in circumstances that
would constitute a violation of international human rights could be
considered directly complicit in the violation.
It is important to note that in criminal law an accomplice can
usually be tried for complicity in a crime even where the principal
perpetrator has not been identified or where guilt could not be
proven against that principal. Equally important, the accomplice
need not desire that the principal offence be committed. To
understand better the scope of direct complicity, we might consider
some passages from judgements of the U.N.'s International Criminal
Tribunals.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda addressed both
issues mentioned above in the Akayesu case.6 The first question is
whether an accomplice can be tried for complicity in a crime even
where the principal perpetrator has not been identified or where the
guilt of that principal perpetrator could not be proven. The Tribunal
Chamber asserted that all criminal systems provide that an
accomplice can be tried in the absence of the conviction of the
principal perpetrator] The abuse must have occurred but it does not
have to have been formally proven in a court of law.
The second issue concerned the question of whether the
accomplice must desire that the principal offence be committed.
Again, the Chamber embarked on a comparative exercise and
6. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, No. ICTR-96-4-T (ICTR Trial Chamber
Sept.
2,
1998),
available
at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgment/akayOOl.htm.
7. Id. T 531.
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asserted that "in all criminal Civil law systems, under Common law,
notably English law, generally, the accomplice need not even wish
that the principal offence be committed."8 They concluded: "As a
result, anyone who knowing of another's criminal purpose,
voluntarily aids him or her in it, can be convicted of complicity even
though he regretted the outcome of the offence."'
Interestingly, the U.N. Tribunal's Chamber bases its reasoning in
part on an English case, National Coal Board v. Gamble, that
involved corporate complicity by an employee of the National Coal
Board in the corporate offence of overloading a lorry." The
judgment continues:
The intent or mental element of complicity implies in general that,
at the moment he acted, the accomplice knew of the assistance he
was providing in the commission of the principal offence. In other
words, the accomplice must have acted knowingly.
Moreover, as in all criminal Civil law systems, under Common law,
notably English law, generally, the accomplice need not even wish
that the principal offence be committed. In the case of National
CoalBoard v. Gamble, Justice Devlin stated:
"an indifference to the result of the crime does not of itself
negate abetting. If one man deliberately sells to another a gun
to be used for murdering a third, he may be indifferent about
whether the third lives or dies and interested only the cash
profit to be made out of the sale, but he can still be an aider
and abettor.""
With regard to the concept of accomplice liability for someone who
generally aids and abets an international crime, we can refer to the
intentional participation test articulated by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. In the Tadic case, the Trial
Chamber summarized the test as follows:
The most relevant sources for such a determination are the
Niimberg war crimes trials, which resulted in several convictions
for complicitous conduct. While the judgments generally failed to
discuss in detail the criteria upon which guilt was determined, a
clear pattern does emerge upon an examination of the relevant
cases. First, there is a requirement of intent, which involves
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. 539.
Id.
See Nat'l Coal Bd. v. Gamble, 1 Q.B. 11 (1959).
Akayesu, Judgment,
538, 539.
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awareness of the act of participation coupled with a conscious
decision to participate by planning, instigating, ordering,
committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of
a crime. Second, the prosecution must prove that there was
participation in that the conduct of the accused contributed to the
commission of the illegal act.12
These applications of the complicity concept by the U.N.
Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals in international trials for war
crimes and genocide have to be seen perhaps in their special contexts.
But complicity has also been referred to by the U.N. International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Furundzija
judgement, which discussed torture as a human rights crime even in
the absence of an armed conflict. 3 It was even suggested in that case
that presence alone may be enough to constitute participation under
certain circumstances:
It may be inferred from this case [the Synagogue case] that an
approving spectator who is held in such respect by the other
perpetrators that his presence encourages them in their conduct,
may be guilty of complicity in a crime against humanity.
It appears from the Synagogue and Pig-cart parade cases that
presence, when combined with authority, can constitute assistance
in the form of moral support, that is, the actus reus of the offence.
The supporter must be of a certain status for this to be sufficient for
criminal responsibility. This emphasis on the accused's authority
was also affirmed in Akayesu. Jean-Paul Akayesu was the
bourgmestre, or mayor, of the Commune in which atrocities,
including rape and sexual violence, occurred. That Trial Chamber
considered this position of authority highly significant for his
criminal liability for aiding and abetting: "The Tribunal finds, under
Article 6(1) of its Statute, that the Accused, having had reason to
know that sexual violence was occurring, aided and abetted the
following acts of sexual violence, by allowing them to take place on
or near the premises of the bureau communal and by facilitating
the commission of such sexual violence through his words of
encouragement in other acts of sexual violence which, by virtue of

12. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 112 I.L.R. 1, 229 (ICrY 1997), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/udgement/index.htm (May 7, 1997).
13. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, No. IT-95-17/1 (ICTY Trial
Chamber
Dec.
10,
1998),
available
at
http://www.un.orglicty/furundzija/trialc2/judgementindex.htm.
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his authority, sent a clear signal of official tolerance for sexual
violence, without which these acts would not have taken place...."

Furthermore, it can be inferred from this finding that assistance
need not be tangible. In addition, assistance need not constitute an
indispensable element, that is, a conditio sine qua non for the acts
of the principal.
In sum, the Trial Chamber holds that the actus reus of aiding and
abetting in international criminal law requires practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support
which has a substantial effect on
14
the perpetration of the crime.
It is relevant for our purposes that the complicity concept has been
examined and applied by these U.N. Tribunals in situations where the
accused was not the principal perpetrator of the crimes, but has
merely through his or her knowing participation encouraged and
contributed to the wrongful act. The Rwanda Tribunal simply stated
that "[t]he ingredients of complicity under Common Law do not
appear to be different from those under Civil Law. To a large extent,
the forms of accomplice participation, namely 'aid and abet, counsel
and procure,' mirror those conducts characterized
' 5 under Civil Law as
Taide et l'assistance, la fourniture des moyens."
The U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia summarized its examination of the international case law
in a way that distinguishes complicity (aiding and abetting) from
common design. This is the same as the distinction between
accomplices and co-perpetrators. For the crime to be committed one
needs both the actus reus (material element) and the mens rea
(mental element).
In sum, the Trial Chamber holds the legal ingredients of aiding and
abetting in international criminal law to be the following: the actus
reus consists of practical assistance, encouragement, or moral
support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime. The mens rea required is the knowledge that these acts
assist the commission of the offence. This notion of aiding and
abetting is to be distinguished from the notion of common design,
where the actus reus consists of participation in a joint criminal

14. Id. 207,209,235 (footnotes omitted).
15. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, No. ICTR-96-4-T,
535 (ICTR Trial
Chamber
Sept.
2,
1998),
available
at
http:llwww.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/AkayesuljudgmentlakayOOl.htm.
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enterprise and the mens rea required is intent to participate. 16
What could this review of the international cases imply for the
category of direct corporate complicity in human rights abuses? We
could summarize our review by stating that, if we apply the same
reasoning to corporations, a corporation will be directly complicit in
human rights abuses where it decides to participate through
assistance in the commission of human rights abuses and that
assistance contributes to the commission of the human rights abuses
by another. The primary perpetrator does not necessarily have to
have been found responsible in order for the corporate accomplice to
be found liable for having contributed to those same human rights
abuses. Nor need the corporation actually wish the results. It is
enough if the corporation or its aents knew of the likely effects of
their assistance.

M. Beneficial Corporate Complicity
The notion of corporate complicity in human rights abuses is not
confined to direct involvement in the execution of illegal acts by
others. As mentioned earlier, complicity has also been used to
describe the corporate position vis-A-vis government violations when
the business benefits from human rights abuses committed by
someone else.
The Danish Human Rights and Business Project combines the
Confederation of Danish Industries, the Danish Centre for Human
Rights and the Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries.
Their report, Defining the Scope of Business Responsibility for
Human Rights Abroad, sounds a warning to companies who benefit
from human rights abuses. 7 The report labels this "indirect
complicity" and takes as an example an oil company embroiled in
litigation concerning forced labour:
In the modern world, the decisions taken by a business can have
major implications for lives and communities geographically and
culturally remote, so businesses do have to be discerning in
identifying their indirect connection to violations. For example, in
the early 1990s several international oil companies undertook a

16. Furundzija,Judgment, T 249.
17. See Human Rights & Business Project, Defining the Scope of Business
Responsibility
for
Human
Rights
Abroad,
available
at
http://www.humanrights.dk/humanrightsbusiness/index.html (last visited Aug. 31,
2001).
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joint venture with the Burmese government and the state oil
company, Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). MOGE
assumed responsibility for providing labour and security for the
construction of a gas pipeline for the project. Allegations later
emerged that forced labour and child labour were used to construct
the pipeline, and that other violations, including torture, and forced
relocation, occurred in MOGE's operations to clear the area and
provide security. Although the main Western partner, Unocal, did
not directly carry out these purported violations itself, because of
its involvement in the project, its liability for acting in concert with
the Burmese government and MOGE in breaching universally
recognised human rights standards is now under consideration in
the United States District Court of California [Nat'l CoalitionGov't
of the Union of Burma v. Unocal Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (N.D. Cal.
1997)]. Businesses must, therefore, be alert to the extent to which
they can be indirectly complicit in human rights violations. 8
This case is currently under appeal,'the complaints against the oil
company having been rejected in August 2000. Whether or not the
U.S. courts ultimately find complicity in this case, the labels of
"indirect" or "beneficial" complicity appear likely to be applied
where companies knowingly benefit from human rights abuses. In a
more recent case, a complaint has been filed against Exxon Mobil
regarding activity in Aceh, Indonesia. The complaint filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia on June 11, 2001,
specifically asks the court to enjoin "Defendants from further
engaging in human rights abuses against Plaintiffs and their fellow
villagers in complicity with the Indonesian Government and
military.' 9

Violations committed by security forces such as the suppression
of peaceful protest against business activities or use of repressive
measures while guarding company facilities are often cited in this
context. What is important for present purposes is the sense that,

where human rights violations occur in the context of a business
operation, the business need not cause the harm for it to become

tainted by the abuses. This is the danger that is being warned against.

IV. Silent Complicity
The notion of silent complicity reflects the expectation on
18. Id. at 13.
19. For full text of the complaint, see http://www.laborrights.org (last updated
Aug. 31,2001).
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companies that they raise systematic or continuous human rights
abuses with the appropriate authorities. Indeed, it reflects the
growing acceptance within companies that there is something
culpable about failing to exercise influence in such circumstances.
The comprehensive report by Chris Avery, Business and Human
Rights in a Time of Change, refers to the approach of Sir Geoffrey
Chandler (Chair of the Amnesty International (UK) Business Group)
who has stated that "Silence or inaction will be seen to provide
comfort to oppression and may be adjudged complicity.... Silence is
not neutrality. To do nothing is not an option." 20
Whether or not such silent complicity would give rise to a finding
of a breach of legal obligation against a company in a court of law, it
has become increasingly clear that the moral dimension of corporate
action or inaction has taken on significant importance. For example,
according to the Ethical Investment Research Information Service,
ethical investors "are becoming less concerned about where a
company operates, and more concerned about the positive steps that
are being taken to prevent complicity in violations and to further
human rights actively.",2' Similarly, shareholder resolutions may put
pressure on chief executives to raise with the authorities issues
regarding human rights defenders or labour activists who have been
imprisoned, even in the absence of any legal obligation on the
company to do so.
The clear recommendation in the literature
designed to assist companies is that a narrow reading of complicity
does not meet today's expectations, particularly in situations where
there is little trust in government and security forces.
The importance of avoiding accusations of silent complicity is
considered by some to be central to sensible risk management in this
area. "TNCs operating in countries with repressive and corrupt
governments are at particular risk of criticism from a wide range of
stakeholders for complicity, tacit or active, in human rights abuses
perpetrated by the state."'
The manual Human Rights: Is it Any of Your Business? contains
a key element for any corporate human rights strategy. This
recommendation makes it clear that the limits of silent complicity will
20.

CHRISTOPHER

L.

AVERY, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN A TIME OF

CHANGE 22 (2000) (quoting Sir Geoffrey Chandler).

21.
visited
22.
23.

AI & PWBF, supra note 2, at 70; see generally http://www.eiris.org (last
Aug. 31, 2001).
AI & PWBF, supra note 2, at 68-70.
Id. at 24; see also id. at 11, 15, 38, 45, 82.
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vary from company to company and depend on the country's context:
Raise human rights concerns with government authorities either
unilaterally or collectively with other companies. Senior managers
should be prepared to speak out where abuses persist and quiet

diplomacy has failed. In developing policies and practices with
regard to human rights, companies need to delineate clearly the
boundaries of their responsibilities, their willingness to become
involved in advocacy and exert influence. This clarifies the extent
of assumed responsibilities and makes it possible to monitor
progress against objectives and targets. 24
In other words, quiet diplomacy may not be enough to avoid
accusations of silent complicity.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to shed some light on the categories of
complicity currently used in the context of the business and human
rights debate. It has also examined the specific meaning of complicity
in international law with regard to individual complicity in
international crimes. Corporate complicity at the international level
has had less attention due to the obvious lack of international courts
with jurisdiction. But it seems safe to assert that international law
considers that intentional participation in an internationally wrongful
act constitutes complicity in the breach of international human rights
law.
One should not underestimate the difficulties of categorizing the
different meanings of complicity in the business context. The limits of
what is meant by complicity tell us a lot about our sense of
community and responsibility towards others as well as expectations
in the communities of those affected by business practices. In
attempting to apply this conceptual breakdown at the U.N. level, it is
worth remembering the Oxford English Dictionary's second listed
meaning for complicity: "state of being complex."'

24. Id. at 11.
25. OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

617 (2d ed. 1989).

